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1. The Debate 
 
 M. H. Hansen has long argued that the Athenian democracy did not give 
magistrates misthos (‘pay’) in the fourth century BC.1 This article questions his 
argument and makes the opposite case that fourth-century Athenians paid their 
officials with public funds as their forebears had certainly done from the late 430s.2 
Hansen bases his argument on the silence of our ancient sources.3 In 411/10 the 
oligarchic regime of the Four Hundred made Athenian magistrates, excepting the 9 
archons, amisthoi or unsalaried ([Arist.] Ath. Pol. 29.5; cf. Thuc. 8.65.3, 67.3). If, 
after they were ousted, this form of remuneration was restored, it was once more 
taken away by the oligarchic regime of 405/4.4 For Hansen there is simply no 
evidence that the democracy in the following year, that is, immediately after its 
second restoration, or at any point in the fourth century started to pay all of its 
magistrates again. In his account of the Athenian constitution of the 320s Aristotle’s 
pupil noted the remuneration of only a fraction of the 329 arkhontes (‘magistrates’) 
which he got around to describing.5 They were the 9 archons, 5 overseas magistrates 
                                                                        
1
 In 2013 this article was presented as the keynote address at Great Britain’s Annual Meeting 
of Ancient Historians (‘the Norman Baynes Meeting’). I thank R. Osborne for this speaking 
invitation. The article draws on my forthcoming book, Public Spending and Democracy in 
Classical Athens, which is under contract with the University of Texas Press. It does so courtesy of 
this press. For their helpful comments I thank this journal’s anonymous referee and its senior editor, 
K. J. Rigsby. I am most grateful to V. Gabrielsen, M. H. Hansen, E. M. Harris, R. Osborne, S. C. 
Todd and especially P. J. Rhodes for discussing with me the question of pay for Athenian 
magistrates. All translations of the Greek are my own unless it is indicated otherwise.    
2
 The earliest evidence of misthos for Athenian magistrates is IG i3 32.8-9.   
3
 M. H. Hansen, “Misthos for Magistrates in Classical Athens,” SO 44 (1979) 5-22, 14-19; 
“Perquisites for Magistrates in Fourth-Century Athens,” C&M 32 (1980) 105-25; “Seven Hundred 
Archai in Classical Athens,” GRBS 21 (1980) 151-73, 167; The Athenian Democracy in the Age of 
Demosthenes: Structure, Principles and Ideology, translated by J. A. Crook (Cambridge, MA, and 
Oxford) 240-2.  
4
 Hansen, SO 44 (1979) 13; Athenian Democracy 240-1.  
5
 I follow P. J. Rhodes in seeing the author of the Ath. Pol. of the 320s as a pupil of Aristotle 
(A Commentary on the Aristotelian Athenaion Politeia [Oxford 1981] 59-63).  
 Page 2 
 
and 10 others who managed the new training program for ephebes (42.3; 62.2).6 On 
misthos, at least, Hansen thinks that this Constitution of the Athenians is not 
‘ridiculously incomplete’ and is corroborated by the silence of the century’s 
inscriptions on misthophoria (‘receipt of pay’) for magistrates.7 Thus this treatise’s 
short list of salaried officials suggests that the Athenians never reversed what the 
oligarchs had done. For Hansen the democracy which they restored was more 
conservative than the fifth-century one.8 He concludes: ‘Considerable concessions 
were made to the oligarchic criticism of radical democracy and the principle ‘no 
misthos for archai’ may well have been one of those concessions.’9  
 In almost all cases fourth-century magistrates may have no longer received 
misthos but Hansen argues that many of them still found other forms of 
compensation.10 Certainly the state gave some of its religious officials a share of 
sacrificed animals, produce from a sanctuary’s lands or free meals in the lead up to a 
festival.11 Hansen argues that magistrates also relied on their own initiative to get 
compensation: some demanded cash-gifts from those requiring their help, while 
others held onto public funds and used them privately for years.12 Generals too, he 
argues, pocketed large gifts from foreigners and most of the booty which they 
captured.13 Hansen holds that a magistrate’s taking of such benefits was common and 
was generally accepted by the dēmos (‘people’).14 But if his requests or acts went 
beyond ‘the accepted limits’, he could be prosecuted for taking bribes or 
misappropriating funds. In three of his treatises Isocrates discussed the money which 
Athenians apparently earned as magistrates (7.24-7; 12.145; 15.145-52). Hansen 
                                                                        
6
 Aristotle’s pupil uses trophē, eis sitēsis and cognate words as synonyms for misthos (V. 
Gabrielsen, Remuneration of State Officials in Fourth Century BC Athens (Odense 1981) 67-81, 
151-5; cf. W. T. Loomis, Wages, Welfare Costs and Inflation in Classical Athens [Ann Arbor 1998] 
26 n. 60).  
7
 Hansen, SO 44 (1979) 14, from where the quotation comes from, 15; cf. D. M. MacDowell, 
Review of Gabrielsen, Remuneration, CR 33 (1983) 75-6, 76.  
8
 Hansen, Athenian Democracy 241, 300-4; cf. D. J. Phillips, “Athens,” in S. Stockwell and B. 
Isakhan (eds.), The Edinburgh Companion to the History of Democracy (Edinburgh 2012) 97-108,  
101-2.  
9
 Hansen, SO 44 (1979) 18.  
10
 Hansen, C&M 32 (1980) 124.  
11
 See, respectively, RO 81.12-13, IG ii2 1672.255-8 and [Arist.] Ath. Pol. 62.2.  
12
 Hansen, C&M 32 (1980) 111-19; Athenian Democracy 241-2.  
13
 Hansen, C&M 32 (1980) 124; Athenian Democracy 241.  
14
 Hansen, C&M 32 (1980) 125.  
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asserts that in two of these treatises Isocrates only had in mind these benefits which 
arkhontes secured independently, while in the third the reference is instead to pay for 
another form of political participation.15   
 The initial reception of Hansen’s argument about the lack of pay for postwar 
magistrates was actually mixed. P. J. Rhodes rejected it immediately.16 V. Gabrielsen 
published a critique of it as a book.17 Admittedly some did quickly back up Hansen 
but just as many did not.18 To this day ancient historians take different sides in this 
debate.19 Settling it one way or another is important for our understanding of the 
development of Athenian democracy. Hansen and others argue that the democracy 
which was restored for a second time in 404/3 curtailed the power of the dēmos.20 But 
E. M. Harris and J. Ober make the opposite case: the fourth-century democracy 
increased their power to change nomoi (‘laws’) and the jurisdiction of their law-
courts.21 Certainly fifth-century Athenians were seriously committed to the poor’s 
participation in the law-courts and in politics.22 From the 450s they introduced 
different forms of public remuneration to make it easier for non-elite citizens to do 
                                                                        
15
 Hansen, C&M 32 (1980) 106-13.  
16
 Hansen SO 44 (1979) 22 n. 46; Rhodes, Commentary 695.  
17
 He published Gabrielsen, Remuneration when he was an undergraduate student. Hansen 
managed to publish his response (C&M 32 [1980]) before this book’s appearance.  
18
 D. M. Lewis (JHS 102 [1982] 269) and MacDowell (CR 33 [1983] 76) backed Hansen in 
reviews of Gabrielsen, Remuneration. In their reviews of the same book G. L. Cawkwell (English 
Historical Review 97 [1983] 839) and R. S. Stroud (American Historical Review 78 [1982] 158-9) 
sided with Gabrielsen.  
19
 For example, E. M. Burke (“The Habit of Subsidization in Classical Athens: Toward a 
Thetic Ideology,” C&M 56 [2005] 5-47, 34) and Loomis (Wages, 182 n. 34) back Gabrielsen, while 
V. Rosivach (“State Pay as War Relief in Peloponnesian-War Athens,” G&R 58 [2011] 176-83, 182 
n. 34) and C. Taylor (“Bribery in Athenian Politics Part I: Accusations, Allegations and Slander,” 
G&R 48 [2001] 53-66, 57) support Hansen. Rhodes (“The Organisation of Athenian Public 
Finance,” G&R 40 [2013] 203-31, 206) and Gabrielsen (“Finance and Taxes,” in H. Beck (ed.), A 
Companion to Ancient Greek Government [Chichester 2013] 332-48, 333) have remained steadfast 
in their rejection of Hansen’s position.     
20
 E.g. Hansen Athenian Democracy 150-5; M. Ostwald, From Popular Sovereignty to the 
Sovereignty of the Law: Law, Society and Politics in Fifth-Century Athens (Berkeley. 1986) 509-24; 
S. C. Todd, “Lady Chatterley’s Lover and the Attic Orators: The Social Composition of the 
Athenian Jury,” JHS 110 (1990) 147-73, 170.  
21
 E.g. E. M. Harris’ ‘From Democracy to the Rule of Law? Constitutional Change in Athens 
during the Fifth and Fourth Centuries BCE,” in C. Tiersche (ed.), Die athenische Demokratie des 4. 
Jh. v. Chr. zwischen Tradition und Modernisierung (Berlin 2014); J. Ober, The Athenian 
Revolution: Essays on Ancient Greek Democracy and Political Theory (Princeton 1996) 29; cf. 
Gabrielsen, Remuneration 54-6.  
22
 Rhodes, Commentary 338.  
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so.23 In view of them the claim of Pericles that poverty was no barrier to political 
participation appears to be fully justified (Thuc. 2.37.1). Therefore the failure of 
fourth-century Athenians to restore misthos for magistrates would be a lessening of 
this commitment. It would indeed support the argument that the restored democracy 
was more conservative than its fifth-century predecessor.  
 I believe there to be three reasons why Hansen’s argument must be called into 
question.24 The first reason is that the dēmos simply did not tolerate the misuse of an 
archonship for personal gain. This makes unlikely the common accepting of bribes 
and stealing of funds which Hansen proposes. The second reason is that poor 
Athenians served as magistrates. Citizens of this social class had to earn a living. 
Since many of the arkhai (‘magistracies’) which they filled were full time, they could 
not have done so unless they received compensation for lost earnings. This could 
come only as misthos from the state. The third reason is evidence. Hansen’s treatment 
of the treatise of Aristotle’s pupil is inconsistent. On public pay for magistrates he 
argues that it is not seriously incomplete. But, when it comes to their number, he 
argues just the opposite.25 Indeed Hansen himself puts beyond doubt that Athens of 
the 330s had twice as many magistrates than the 329 which Aristotle’s pupil 
mentioned.26 Much more serious is that we do in fact have evidence for the state’s 
payment of fourth-century officials and lack evidence for what we should see if 
Hansen were right. Thus we have no reason to doubt that misthos for magistrates was 
re-introduced at the same time as it was for councillors and jurors: immediately after 
the democracy’s second restoration in 404/3.27  
 
 
 
 
                                                                        
23
 [Arist.] Ath. Pol. 27.1-4; Arist. Pol. 1274a8-9; Pl. Grg. 515e; Plut. Per. 9.1-3.  
24
 In their own refutations Gabrielsen and Rhodes canvassed these 3 reasons to varying 
extents. Gabrielsen touched on the first only in passing and did not develop fully the second. He 
was immensely strong on the third. Rhodes dealt briefly with the second only.  
25
 Hansen, GRBS 21 (1980) 166.  
26
 Hansen, GRBS 21 (1980). His documenting of this higher number has been widely accepted 
(e.g. P. Liddell, Civic Obligation and Individual Liberty in Ancient Athens [Oxford 2007] 229; D. 
Stockton, The Classical Athenian Democracy [Oxford 1990] 111-12).   
27
 The first reference to jury pay postwar is Ar. Eccl. 683-8. For the quick restoration of 
council pay, see Hansen, SO 44 (1979) 15-16; Rosivach, G&R 58 (2011) 182.  
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2. The Lack of Public Tolerance of Financial Misconduct by Magistrates 
 
 Athenians of the fourth century had a dim view of magistrates who took bribes 
or misappropriated funds.28 For them this behaviour was ‘terrible and abominable’ 
(Antiph. 6.49). Public speakers consistently described such acts as adikēmata or 
wrongs (e.g. Antiph. 6.35, 49; 2.1.6; Dem. 24.5, 102, 110-11; Lys. 27.4, 6). The 
dēmos believed that bribes corrupted magistrates (e.g. Lys. 28.9; 30.2, 5, 25). In no 
way were accepting them and stealing public money thought of as norms (e.g. 
Aeschin. 1.106, 110-13; Dem. 24.14, 112; Lys. 27.2-3, 6-8; 28.3-4), while ‘just’ or 
‘good’ magistrates committed neither crime (Lys. 28.9, 15-16). The 9 archons vowed 
not ‘to take dōra or gifts on account of their magistracy’ ([Arist.] Ath. Pol. 55.5). The 
dēmos acted on this strongly held belief. They made it illegal for a magistrate to take 
gifts or to steal public funds (54.2; 59.3).29 ‘Nor were the Athenian people loath to 
inflict severe penalties on magistrates who failed them.’30 When it came to these 
graphai (‘public offences’), their jurors showed no leniency (e.g. Dem. 19.273; 
22.39; 24.112; Lys. 28.3-4; 29.6), convicting arkhontes for, for example, a short 
delay in returning public funds or accepting small-scale bribes (Dem. 19.293). A 
magistrate who was convicted of either graphē was fined ten times what he had taken 
illegally (e.g. Din. 1.60; 2.17).  
 For the sake of catching such wrongdoers the fourth-century democracy 
monitored its magistrates closely.31 In the kuria ekklēsia or main assembly-meeting of 
each prytany a vote was taken on their performance ([Arist.] Ath. Pol. 43.4; 61.2).32 
This was the chance for anyone to accuse a magistrate of wrongdoing (e.g. Aeschin. 
1.110; [Dem.] 50.12; Dem. 58.28). Private citizens could also accuse a public official 
of ‘not using the nomoi’ before the council ([Arist.] Ath. Pol. 45.2).33 A bouleutēs 
(‘councillor’) could do the same (Antiph. 6.12, 35, 45, 49). Such denunciations 
                                                                        
28
 Taylor, G&R 48 (2001) 160.  
29
 Gabrielsen, Remuneration 100; Rhodes, Commentary 598.  
30
 D. Hamel, Athenian Generals: Military Authority in the Classical Period (Boston, Cologne 
and Leiden 1998) 122.  
31
 C. Taylor, “Bribery in Athenian Politics Part II: Ancient Reaction and Reception,” G&R 48 
(2001) 154-72, 154-7.  
32
 Hamel, Athenian Generals 122-3; Hansen, Athenian Democracy 220-1; Rhodes, 
Commentary 540-1.  
33
 Hansen, Athenian Democracy 221-2.  
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normally ended up before a law-court (e.g. ([Arist.] Ath. Pol. 45.2; 61.2). In addition 
the accounts of every magistrate were regularly checked. A committee of the boulē 
(‘council’) did so every prytany (45.2; 48.3; Lys. 30.5).34 At the end of his term, 
finally, a magistrate underwent an euthuna or scrutiny.35 The mainstay of it was the 
auditing of his logos or accounts (e.g. ([Arist.] Ath. Pol. 48.4-5; 54.2; Dem. 18.117; 
19.273; cf. Aeschin. 3.23). He had to be present for his audit’s results. They were 
announced before a jury of 501 so that, if evidence of malfeasance was revealed, he 
could be prosecuted straightaway on one or more of the graphai concerning 
magistrates (Aeschin. 3.10).  
 Wealthy Athenians could afford lessons in public speaking and hence found it 
easy to denounce a magistrate on the Pnyx or in the bouleutērion.36 The motivation 
for them doing so usually was that the official whom they were denouncing was a 
personal enemy (e.g. Antiph. 2.1.5, 6; Aeschin. 1.100; Dem. 24.8-9).37 Thus it is no 
surprise that many of the known arkhontes who were prosecuted were wealthy 
politicians.38 It was taken for granted that poor citizens as individuals were far less 
capable of pursuing wrongdoers in the law-courts (e.g. Dem. 44.28; 21.123-4, 141, 
219; Lys. 24.16-17).39 Importantly, however, the democracy’s monitoring of its 
officeholders relied only in part on this initiative of wealthy individuals, because the 
checking of accounts was in the hands of not individuals but committees. In 
particular it was a board of 10 logistai or auditors who scrutinised a magistrate’s 
logos at the end of his term (Aeschin. 1.107; [Arist.] Ath. Pol. 54.2). If they suspected 
him of committing a graphē, his prosecution did not depend on their ability as public 
speakers, as they had the use of 10 sunēgoroi or public prosecutors for this purpose.40 
The result was that poor Athenians too were regularly convicted for financial crimes 
which they had committed as magistrates (e.g. Lys. 27.4-6; Dem. 24.112).  
                                                                        
34
 Hansen, Athenian Democracy 221; Rhodes, Commentary 540-1.   
35
 Hamel, Athenian Generals 126-30; Hansen, Athenian Democracy 222-4.    
36
 For the elite’s purchasing of such lessons, see D. M. Pritchard, Sport, Democracy and War 
in Classical Athens (Cambridge 2013) 5, 46, 107.  
37
 Taylor, G&R 48 [2001]: 61-4.   
38
 M. H. Hansen, “Rhetores and Strategoi in Fourth-Century Athens,” C&M 24 (1983) 151-
80, 42, 42 n. 32.  
39
 Pritchard, Sport, Democracy and War 8.   
40
 Hansen, Athenian Democracy 222-3.  
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 This lack of public tolerance of bribe taking and stealing public funds makes it 
very unlikely that they were common practices among its 700-odd magistrates. The 
dēmos strongly believed that good officeholders did not commit such acts. Thus 
aiskhunē or a sense of shame would have dissuaded the vast majority from engaging 
in such adikēmata.41 Magistrates feared too the nomoi regulating their service. They 
did not need to be reminded of the constant monitoring under which they carried out 
their duties and the penchant of their fellow citizens for punishing harshly arkhontes 
who erred. Poor magistrates especially would have struggled to pay the fine of ten 
times which a conviction brought. The fact that public debtors suffered atimia (‘loss 
of citizenship-rights’) made this penalty in itself a strong deterrent.42  
 The prosecution of stratēgoi (‘generals’) by fourth-century Athens shows how 
there was little acceptance of financial wrongdoing by magistrates. With the collapse 
of the Athenian arkhē (‘empire’) generals regularly were required to raise funds in 
the field.43 But they could not treat them as their own as the imperatores of the 
Roman Republic would come to do.44 Money so raised was judged to be public 
property.45 The dēmos authorised its collection and usage either before a stratēgos 
departed or during a campaign (Dem. 8.9; 21.3; Diod. Sic. 16.57.2-3; Lys. 28.5-6).46 
On his return he submitted a logos of what he had raised in the field and handed over 
any surplus to the city (Dem. 20.17-80; Lys. 28.6).47 In the fourth century 2 out of 
each year’s 10 generals were on average the targets of an eisangelia eis ton dēmon or 
                                                                        
41
 For this role of aiskhunē in regulating Athenian behaviour, see R. K. Balot, “Democratizing 
Courage in Classical Athens,” in D. M. Pritchard (ed.), War, Democracy and Culture in Classical 
Athens (Cambridge 2010) 88-108, 101-3.   
42
 For the atimia of public debtors, see Dem. 59.6.  
43
 D. M Pritchard, “Costing Festivals and War: Spending Priorities of the Athenian 
Democracy,” Historia 61 (2012) 18-65, 48-9.     
44
 Hamel, Athenian Generals 158 pace Taylor, G&R 48 (2001) 61.  
45
 E.g. Dem. 24.11-14; Lys. 28.1-4, 6, 10; 29.2, 5, 8-11, 14; Xen. Hell. 1.2.4-5.  
46
 L. A. Burckhardt, “Söldner und Bürger als Soldaten für Athen,” in W. Eder (ed.), Die 
athenische Demokratie im. 4. Jahrhundert v. Chr.: Vollendung oder Verfall einer 
Verfassungsform?: Akten eines Symposiums 3.-7. August 1992, Bellagio (Stuttgart 1995) 107-33, 
115, 130; Burke, C&M 56 (2005) 35; Hamel, Athenian Generals 44-6; P. Millett, “War, Economy, 
and Democracy in Classical Athens,” in J. Rich and G. Shipley (eds), War and Society in the Greek 
World (London and New York 1993) 177-96, 190; “Finance and Resources: Public, Private and 
Personal,” in A. Erskine (ed.), A Companion to Ancient History (Chichester 2009) 474-85, 475; W. 
K. Pritchett, The Greek State at War: Part I (Berkeley, London and Los Angeles 1971) 87-90.  
47
 P. Fröhlich, “Remarques sur la reddition des comptes des stratèges athéniens,” Dike 3 
(2000) 81-111. 
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denunciation before the people.48 This prosecution was employed in cases of treason 
or political corruption (e.g. Dem. 49.67; Hyp. 3.7-8).49 Almost every case involving a 
stratēgos resulted in his conviction (Dem. 19.180).50 Generals understandably feared 
the possibility of such a denunciation back home (e.g. Thuc. 1.49.4; 3.98.5; 7.48.4-5; 
Diod. Sic. 15.31.1).51 Some of these cases centred on a general’s handling of funds. 
In 380/79, for example, Ergocles was denounced for accepting dōra and stealing 
funds which he had raised as a general (Lys. 28.1-2, 11; 29.2, 5, 11).52  He was 
condemned to death by the dēmos and quickly executed (29.2). In 356/5 Timotheus, 
who had won many victories for Athens, was denounced by a fellow general for 
accepting gifts from foreigners (Din. 1.14; 3.17).53 The people fined him an 
unprecedented 100 talents (Isoc. 15.129; Nep. Timoth. 3.5). He was unable to pay and 
so went into exile where he died soon afterwards (Plut. Mor. 605f). Such 
denunciations left Athenian stratēgoi in no doubt of the danger of any appearance of 
financial wrongdoing.  
 
3. The Prevalence of Poor Citizens Serving as Magistrates 
 
 Poor Athenians volunteered to fill magistracies requiring a full-time 
commitment. Demosthenes assumed that they regularly served as, for example, 
astunomoi (24.112). This board’s responsibilities were the safety and the cleanliness 
of the streets (e.g. IG ii2 380).54 Five of its members worked in Athens and 5 in its 
port ([Arist.] Ath. Pol. 50.2). Aristotle’s pupil writes: ‘They prevent buildings which 
encroach on the streets, balconies which extend over the streets, overhead drain pipes 
which discharge on the streets, and window-shutters which open into the street.’55 In 
addition the astunomoi forced the city’s dung-collectors to dump their loads well 
beyond its walls and removed the bodies of the dead homeless. They enforced, 
finally, the nomoi which the Athenians occasionally passed against the elite’s 
                                                                        
48
 Hamel, Athenian Generals 130-2; Hansen, Athenian Democracy 216-18.  
49
 Hansen, Athenian Democracy 212-15.  
50
 Hamel, Athenian Generals 132, 136.  
51
 Hamel, Athenian Generals 118.  
52
 Hamel, Athenian Generals 148.  
53
 Hamel, Athenian Generals 135, 155.  
54
 Rhodes, Commentary 573-4.  
55
 Translated by P. J. Rhodes.  
 Page 9 
 
conspicuous consumption (e.g. Diog. Laert. 6.90).56 Fulfilling these demanding duties 
would have required every member of this board to work on a full-time basis.   
 There is direct evidence of poor citizens also serving as agoranomoi or 
marketplace-regulators (Dem. 24.112), treasurers of Athena ([Arist.] Ath. Pol.47.1) 
and the basileus or king ([Dem.] 39.72). What we know of the duties of these 3 
arkhontes indicates that they were no less time-consuming.57 In addition authors of 
fourth-century Athens and its inscriptions detail the duties of its other 83 
magistracies.58 On the basis of what they say about the duties of each position it is 
possible likewise to estimate roughly whether it required a full-time, half-time or 
quarter-time commitment. Table 1 gives the results of this estimating. It lists the 
arkhontes in the order in which they are discussed in the Constitution of the 
Athenians and, after that, in Hansen’s analysis of the ones which Aristotle’s pupil 
failed to mention.59 This table shows how more than a third of Athenian magistracies 
were full time. As it was very common for poor citizens to be magistrates (e.g. Dem. 
Exordia 55; Lys. 24.9, 13; 27.4-5), many of them would have filled these more 
demanding roles.60 In doing so they had to neglect completely other daytime 
obligations. What the members of this social class had in common was a lack of 
skholē (‘leisure’).61 Wealth relieved the wealthy of the need of working and hence 
gave them such skholē (e.g. Ar. Plut. 281; Vesp. 552-7; Men. Dys. 293-5). By 
contrast, the poor had to work for a living (e.g. Ar. Pax 632; Vesp. 611; Plut. 281; 
Lys. 24.16).62 This was reflected in social terminology, as penēs, which was the word 
used most often for a poor man, was derived from the verb penomai, whose primary 
meaning was to work. Poor Athenians thus could not have taken up full-time 
magistracies unless they were compensated for lost earnings.63 Because nomoi 
                                                                        
56
 For this consumption of the elite, see Pritchard, Sport, Democracy and War 4-5, 130-3.  
57
 For the duties of the agoranomoi, see Ar. Ach. 724, 968; [Arist.] Ath. Pol. 51.1; Dem. 
57.31, 34; Rhodes, Commentary 575-6. For the treasurers of Athena, see [Arist.] Ath. Pol. 47.1; 
60.3; Gabrielsen, Remuneration 145 n. 114; Hansen, C&M 32 (1980) 121; Rhodes, Commentary 
575-6. For the basileus, see [Arist.] Ath. Pol. 57; Rhodes, Commentary 636-50.  
58
 Here Rhodes, Commentary is indispensible.  
59
 Hansen, GRBS 21 (1980) 156-62.  
60
 For this non-elite participation of the poor, see Gabrielsen, Remuneration 111-19.  
61
 Pritchard, Sport, Democracy and War 4, 8-9, 57-8.  
62
 V. Rosivach, “Class Matters in the Dyskolos of Menander,” CQ (2001) 51: 127-34, 127, 
133.  
63
 Gabrielsen, Remuneration 118-19; A. H. M. Jones, Athenian Democracy (Oxford 1957) 18.  
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stopped magistrates from securing it on their own initiative, this compensation could 
only come as misthos from the state. In Aristotle’s words ‘receiving misthos’ made 
sure that poor citizens were ‘able to have skholē’ for political participation (Pol. 
1293a1-10).  
  
 
Table 1: The Time-Commitments and Numbers of Athenian Magistrates  
in the 330s  
 
10 sōphronistai F/T 1 polemarkhos F/T 
1 kosmētēs F/T  6 thesmothetai F/T 
1 tamias stratiōtikōn F/T 10 athlothetai Q/T 
10 hoi epi to theōrikon  F/T 10 stratēgoi F/T 
1 ho tōn krēnōn epimelētēs F/T 10 taxiarkhoi F/T 
10 tamias tēs Athēnas F/T 2 hipparkhoi F/T 
10 pōlētai F/T 10 phularkhoi F/T 
10 apodektai Q/T 1 hipparkhos eis Lēmnon F/T 
10 katalogeis Q/T 1 tamias tēs Paralou  F/T 
1 tamias tois adunatois F/T 1 tamias tēs tou Ammōnos F/T 
10 hierōn episkeuastai H/T 5 amphiktuones eis Dēlian Q/T 
10 astunomoi F/T. 1 anagrapheus F/T 
10 agoranomoi F/T 1 antigrapheus F/T 
10 metronomoi F/T. 10  boōnai H/T 
35 sitophulakes F/T 1 grammateus epi ta psēphismata F/T 
10 epimelētai tou emporiou F/T 10 epimelētai tōn neōriōn F/T 
11 hoi endeka F/T 10 epimelētai tou Amphiareiou Q/T 
5 eisagōgeis H/T 10 epistatai Braurōnothen Q/T 
40 hoi tettarakonta H/T 7 epistatai Eleusinothen F/T 
5 hodopoioi F/T 10 epistatai tou argurokopiou H/T  
10 logistai H/T 10 epistatai tou Asklēpieiou Q/T 
10 sunēgoroi tois logistais H/T 10 epistatai tou hierou tēs Agathēs    
        Tukhēs 
Q/T 
1 grammateus kata prutaneian F/T 1 hieromnēmōn F/T 
1 grammateus epi tous nomous F/T 10 hieropoioi eis Panathenēnaia Q/T 
1 grammateus tou dēmou F/T 10 hieropoioi tais semnais theais Q/T 
10 hieropoioi epi ta ekthusmata H/T 9 nomophulakes Q/T 
10 hieropoioi kat’ eniauton F/T 10 praktores H/T 
1 arkhōn eis Salamina H/T 2 tamiai toin theoin F/T 
1 dēmarkhos eis Peiraieia F/T 1  tamias eis ta neōria F/T  
1 grammateus tois  
        thesmothetais 
F/T 1 tamias kremastōn H/T 
1 arkhōn eponumos F/T.  1 tamias triēropoiikōn H/T 
10 epimelētai eis Dionysia Q/T 1 tamias tēs boulēs F/T 
4 epimelētai mustēriōn H/T 1 tamias tou dēmou H/T 
1 basileus F/T 200 20 other boards of religious  
        supervisors  
Q/T 
      
F/T = Full Time, H/T = Half Time and Q/T = Quarter Time 
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4. The Evidence for the Payment of Fourth-Century Magistrates 
 
 Three treatises of Isocrates evidence the continuation of the democracy’s 
payment of its arkhontes into the fourth century.64 This writer composed his 
Areopagiticus and Panathenaicus mid-century.65 In them he argued that the 
Athenians should replace the form of the democracy to which theirs had degenerated 
with the form which – he claimed – it had originally taken (e.g. 7.15-19; 15.145-52).  
In support of what was in fact an argument for the disempowerment of the dēmos 
Isocrates contrasted this ancestral constitution’s magistrates with those of his day 
(7.22-7; 15.145-7).66 Every one of them, he wrote, was elected and, instead of 
receiving misthos, often had to spend their own money (7.22, 24-5; 15.145). 
Consequently they were motivated out of a sense of duty (7.24). Because these arkhai 
were the same as the liturgies which wealthy citizens of the classical period 
performed (12.145), most archaic Athenians avoided them (7.25; 12.146).67 By 
contrast, fourth-century arkhontes were appointed by lot and paid (7.22-4; 15.145-6). 
For Isocrates their only motive was personal gain (7.25). Indeed he characterised 
them as thoroughly money-grubbing: they knew ‘more accurately the prosodoi or 
incomes from the magistracies than from their own businesses’ (7.24), while, when 
they took up their positions, their first act was to see whether their predecessors had 
overlooked any lemma or payment to which they had been entitled (25).68 With 
money to be made there was now intense competition for arkhai (7.24-5; 15.145). 
Isocrates confirmed that this pay came only from the state; for he wrote of how the 
first magistrates, in contrast to contemporary ones, did not ‘keep house out of public 
funds’ and abstained completely from ‘the money of the polis’ (7.24-5).  
 In these treatises Isocrates was obviously giving expression to the negative 
view of what motivated hundreds of poor Athenians to serve as arkhontes every 
year.69 He was able to do so, as he was writing only for elite readers.70 They generally 
                                                                        
64
 Gabrielsen, Remuneration 88-108.  
65
 J. Ober, Political Dissent in Democratic Athens (Princeton 1998) 256, 277.  
66
 For this argument, see Ober, Political Dissent 277-82.  
67
 For the classical elite’s responsibility for liturgies, see Pritchard, Sport, Democracy and 
War 6-7, 99.  
68
 Fourth-century writers quite frequently used lemma as a synonym of misthos for political 
participation (e.g. Arist. Pol. 1318b15-16; Dem. 3.34; Isoc. 8.130; 15.152).  
69
 It clearly is a view which dates back to the previous century (e.g. [Xen.] Ath. Pol.1.13).  
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had criticisms of the contemporary democracy and expected the intellectuals whom 
they read to address them.71 Consequently Isocrates was free to articulate their 
criticisms and to advocate strongly for constitutional changes.  Nonetheless other 
aspects of his depiction of magistrates are corroborated by his contemporaries. In a 
legal speech Lysias for one noted how magistrates were paid out of public funds 
(21.19; cf. 19.56-7). Certainly fourth-century writers give the impression that 
Athenians competed fiercely for arkhai.72 In most cases they were referring to the 
100 or so of them which were filled by election.73 But there apparently was 
competition too for the other magistracies: a lottery was normally required to appoint 
them (e.g. Dem. 39.102; Lys. 6.4; 31.33), which indicates that the volunteers who had 
offered themselves for offices exceeded the number of positions available.  
This testimony of Isocrates is bolstered by what we do not see in the fourth 
century’s legal speeches.74 Without misthos Athenian magistracies would – as 
Isocrates suggested – have resembled liturgies, because they would have been a 
burden on those who held them. Wealthy defendants invariably sought to win over 
juries by cataloguing the liturgies and other agatha or public benefactions which they 
had undertaken for the city (e.g. Lys. 3.46; 12.38; 30.1).75 Some even admitted that 
they had only performed such benefactions in order to secure the kharis or gratitude 
of any future jury (e.g. 18.23; 20.31; 25.11-13). Thus if arkhai were unsalaried and so 
akin to liturgies, we should find speakers regularly discussing them in court. But this 
is exactly what we do not find: elite litigants simply did not list magistracies among 
their public benefactions. 
 In his Antidosis Isocrates actually made a virtue out of his lack of experience as 
a magistrate. In the mid-350s he was challenged to an antidosis or an exchange of 
properties.76 A citizen who had been assigned a trierarchy believed that Isocrates was 
better qualified to carry it out because of his apparently greater wealth. Consequently 
he used the antidosis-procedure to challenge him either to take over this liturgy or to 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                             
70
 Pritchard, Sport, Democracy and War 19-20, 113, 160.  
71
 Ober, Political Dissent 249, 254-5.  
72
 For examples, see Hansen, C&M 32 (1980) 120 n. 36.  
73
 Hansen, C&M 32 (1980) 120; Athenian Democracy 232-3.  
74
 Gabrielsen, Remuneration 119-46.  
75
 E. M. Harris, The Rule of Law in Action in Democratic Athens (Oxford 2013) 387-400.  
76
 Ober, Political Dissent 256.  
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exchange properties with him.77 Isocrates refused to do either and so it fell to a jury to 
work out who should bear this liturgy. This case, which Isocrates lost (12.5-6, 144-5), 
showed him clearly how many Athenians had a dim view of both his métier as a 
teacher of public speaking and also his relationship to their democracy more 
generally (4-5). Isocrates claimed that this third treatise was his attempt to rehabilitate 
his public image (7-10). In it Isocrates portrayed himself as a benefactor by asserting 
repeatedly that he preferred to perform agatha than to hold paid positions (e.g. 150-
1). At chapter 145, for example, he wrote how he had refrained from ‘the arkhai and 
the profits which are there and all other koina or public prerogatives’. Yet this did not 
stop him performing liturgies. Isocrates confirmed again that the state paid 
magistrates when, at chapter 152, he explained why he had always avoided ‘the 
lēmmata or payments from the city’. Because Isocrates was claiming that he had 
never accepted political pay during his life, this treatise, which he wrote in his 
eighties, actually serves as evidence of the remuneration of Athenian magistrates 
throughout the fourth century.  
 Hansen’s lifetime of work has deepened enormously our knowledge of Athenian 
democracy. But on the remuneration of magistrates we should not follow him. 
Fourth-century Athens paid its magistrates just as it did its jurors, councillors and 
assemblygoers. There is thus one less reason to believe that its restored democracy 
was more conservative than its fifth-century predecessor.   
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